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INTRODUCTION
The aim of the paper is to analyse the countries of South East Europe (SEE)
as a location for foreign direct investment (FDI). In the first section we present
the economic situation and trends in SEE countries, which are of specific rele-
vance for investors from abroad. Second section deals with FDI trends and situa-
tion in SEE countries, while the third section analyses investment climate in SEE
countries. Section four argue in favour of speeding up EU and regional integra-
tion processes in the SEE region, and section five concludes.
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ABSTRACT:  Foreign direct investment
(FDI) has played an important role in the
restructuring of economies of the new mem-
ber countries of the European Union. FDI
levels in South East Europe (SEE) are much
lower than in the CEE countries in transi-
tion, what reduces the potential restructur-
ing impact of FDI in SEE. The issue here is,
how to strengthen FDI inflows in SEE. Along
these lines, the aim of the paper is to analyse
the countries of SEE as a location for FDI. In
the first section we present the economic sit-
uation and trends in SEE countries, which
are of specific relevance for investors from
abroad. Second section deals with FDI
trends and situation in SEE countries, while
the third section analyses individual ele-
ments of investment climate in SEE coun-
tries. In section four we argue that EU and
regional integration processes in SEE are
important for making the region a more
attractive location for FDI.
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ORIGINALNI NAU^NI RADOVI/SCIENTIFIC PAPERS1. ECONOMIC SITUATION AND TRENDS IN SEE COUNTRIES OF SPECIFIC
RELEVANCE FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS
The region of South East Europe (SEE) is comprised of eight ex–socialist
Balkan countries, including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, and Serbia and Montenegro. This is a region
with a rather large population, but quite a low level of development. It has a total
population of 57.6 million people and its total GDP is less than US$ 100 billion.
The size of its population is about 85 per cent of that in Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE), while its GDP is only 36 per cent of GDP in CEE.
There are great differences in size, population and the level of economic
development among the SEE countries. With its 22.3 million inhabitants,
Romania is the largest country in the region, while the other countries have
much fewer inhabitants and can be regarded as small countries. Their average
GDP per capita is well below US$ 2,000 and ranges from US$ 6,600 in the most
advanced Croatia to US$ 450 in the least developed Moldova (Table 1).
TABLE 1: Basic indicators of SEE
Source: EBRD 2003; WIIW Database; National statistics.
Note: 1 Without data on Kosovo.
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Population 
(million,  
Population 
(million,   GDP   GDP   GDP  
mid–1990)  mid–2001) 
Per capita in 
US$,  
Per capita in 
US$,  
(EUR 
million), 
mid–2002 
         mid–1990  mid–2003    
Albania  3,2  3,4  638  1.765  4.908 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  4,5  4,3  2396  1.857  5.574 
Bulgaria  8,7  8,1  1343  2.505  16.668 
Croatia  4,8  4,6  5106  6.609  23.820 
Serbia and 
Montenegro
1  8,5  8,6  3647  2.507  14.000 
Macedonia  2,1  2  2512  2.314  3.916 
Romania  23,2  22,3  1257  2.510  48.384 
Moldova  4,4  4,3  293  451  1.938 
SEE  59,4  57,6  1953  2036  119.208 During the past decade, the SEE countries as a group recorded much slower
economic growth and progress in transition as compared to the CEE
fast–reforming countries in transition (Stern 1998, Fisher and Sahay 2000).
Their slow progress in transition can be attributed not only to inconsistent
macroeconomic stabilisation policies, recurrent economic crises and
unfavourable initial conditions, but also to the devastating consequences of wars
and political and ethnic conflicts in the region. This resulted in the region lagging
behind CEE, in which the process of transition was much more successful thanks
to a relatively stable political environment and clear orientation towards a fast
and efficient implementation of reforms. However, the growth rates in the last
three years were higher in SEE than in CEE countries.
TABLE 2: Real GDP Growth in SEE countries, 1991-2003 (per cent)
Source: EBRD 2003; UN ECE. 2004.
1/ Croatia and Moldova are not included in SEE average.
2/ Croatia is included in CEE average.
The SEE countries had different starting positions and are characterised by a
wide disparity in the progress of reforms and economic growth during the past
decade. The former Yugoslav republics, which had some experience with a mar-
ket economy and much higher GDP per capita, had more favourable starting
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Real GDP 
in 2003 
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(1989=100) 
Albania  -28  -7,2  9,6  8,3  13,3  9,1  -7  8  7,3  7,8  6,5  6  6  124 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  -12,1  -30  -40  -40  20,8  86  37  9,9  10,6  4,5  2,3  3  3,5  56 
Bulgaria  -11,7  -7,3  -1,5  1,8  2,9  -9,4  -5,6  4  2,3  5,4  4  4  4,5  87 
Croatia  -21,1  -11,7  -8  5,9  6,8  6  6,5  2,5  -0,9  2,9  3,8  3,5  4,2  91 
Moldova  -17,5  -29,1  -1,2  -31,2  -1,4  -5,9  1,6  -6,5  -3,4  2,1  6,1  3,5  5,5  41 
Romania  -12,9  -8,8  1,5  3,9  7,1  3,9  -6,1  -5,4  -3,2  1,8  5,3  3,5  4,2  92 
Macedonia  -7  -8  -9,1  -1,8  -1,2  1,2  1,4  3,4  4,3  4,6  -4,1  2  3  81 
Serbia and 
Montenegro  -11,6  -27,9  -30,8  2,5  6,1  7,8  10,1  1,9  -18  5  5,5  3  2  50 
SEE
1  -14,8  -9,6  -2,4  3  6,4  3,5  -0,5  -0,7  -3,4  3,6  4,5  3,6  3,9  85 
CEE
2  -10,3  -2,2  0,3  3,9  5,4  4,7  5  3,6  2,8  4  2,5  2,3  3,3  115 positions than the other, mostly centrally planned, countries from this region
(Gligorov 2000) (Table 1). Political and armed conflicts in some of the former
Yugoslav republics brought about a slowdown in the process of transition and
even its suspension. Moreover, very unfavourable macroeconomic trends made
them lose the advantage of having a relatively favourable starting position.
The economic recovery of SEE was slow and unsustainable. As opposed to
the CEE region, where the transition recession lasted for a shorter period and the
decline in GDP was less pronounced, so that its level from the pre–transition
period could be reached as early as 1997, the SEE region is characterised by a
considerably longer period of transition recession and less stable macroeconom-
ic trends. The fall in GDP in the SEE countries was much more pronounced and
the periods of recovery were short and unsustainable (Table 2).
Such trends can be largely explained by slow and incomplete reforms in SEE.
The initial phase of transition produced some positive results in the whole
region. Namely, noteworthy results were achieved in the field of liberalisation
and small–scale privatisation. However, the structural and institutional chal-
lenges of the next phase of transition, including corporate governance, enterprise
restructuring, financial sector reform, infrastructure reform, as well as fiscal and
social sector reform posed a much more serious problem for the SEE countries.
These reforms were slow and incomplete. The slow restructuring of enterprises
and the financial sector, problematic corporate governance and the lack of cru-
cial institutional infrastructure in the region brought about a slowdown in the
process of transition and posed a serious obstacle to future economic growth.
The progress made in carrying out reforms was largely reflected in the move-
ment of GDP in the region. The first phase of transition recession, which lasted
until 1994 and was marked by a certain degree of liberalisation and progress in
the process of privatisation, was followed by the period (1994–96) during which
GDP growth was restored to some extent. Due to slow and incomplete reforms
in the second phase of transition, the region plunged again into a serious eco-
nomic crisis (in the period 1997–99), which also brought about a decline in GDP
in most countries. The most severe crisis in the region was in 1999, during the
armed conflicts in Kosovo and NATO bombing of Serbia and Montenegro. The
resoluteness of the international community to take an active part not only in
resolving political conflicts in the region, but also in creating conditions for its
economic recovery and efficient reforms after the suspension of hostilities in
Kosovo, resulted in the resumption of the process of reforms and economic
recovery of the region to some degree in 2000. The favourable trend was record-
ed in 2001, 2002 and 2003, but the good prospects this trend to continue in the
forthcoming period might be jeopardised by recent conflicts in Kosovo.
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Slavica Penev, Matija RojecTABLE 3: Gross fixed investment as % of GDP in SEE countries,1985–2002
Source: National statistics, EBRD database, WIIW database
During the period of reforms, investments were displaying similar trends to
GDP. When contrasted to the former Yugoslav republics, in which a sharp
decline in the investment rate was recorded as early as the 1980s, the other coun-
tries in this region, like the CEE countries, had a relatively high investment rate
in the pre–transition period. In the early 1990s, the investment rates in all coun-
tries in the region declined sharply, so that in 1994 their level was only 15 per
cent (Table 3).
The low level of investment activity in the SEE countries during the past
decade posed an obstacle to faster economic reforms and economic recovery of
the region, because investment activity not only increases the capital stock of the
economy, but also exerts influence on the restructuring of enterprises and the
economy as a whole. In addition, it facilitates the optimal reallocation of existing
material and human resources.
The level of domestic saving in the SEE countries was relatively low. Since
domestic saving was insufficient to finance the total amount of investment
required for the optimal reallocation of resources and radical economic structur-
al change, the inflow of foreign capital was a vital prerequisite for the continua-
tion of reforms and transition process. The inflow of foreign capital was not suf-
ficient so as to increase the level of investment in the region as required, because
the inflow of official capital was relatively modest and private foreign capital was
not sufficiently interested in investing in this region due to its unfavourable
investment environment.
During the past decade, official capital flows into all transition countries
declined in relative importance and private foreign capital became the principal
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   1985  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Albania  33  32  31  31  5  13  18  18  16  16  16  17  19  19  23 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  25  20  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  20  42  41  38  33  n.a.  n.a.  20 
Bulgaria  32  26  26  21  16  13  14  16  8  11  15  16  18  17  20 
Croatia  19  17  13  14  14  14  14  16  21  24  24  23  22  26  27 
Moldova  26  22  19  18  16  16  19  16  19  20  22  n.a.  n.a.  21  23 
Romania  33  30  30  20  19  18  20  24  25  22  21  20  22  19  23 
Macedonia  15  16  17  17  17  17  14  17  17  18  18  16  19  19  20 
Serbia and 
Montenegro  21  21  19  18  17  14  13  13  12  11  11  9  12  16  16 external source of investment. In the CEE countries, which carried out social and
economic reforms in large measure, official capital lost its importance almost
completely. However, for the SEE countries it is still important as an additional
source of investment, as well as due to its favourable effects on the progress of
reforms in those countries, which are facing the problems in conducting the
process of transition. Official capital lessens the investment risk and uncertainty,
while at the same time increasing the amount of domestic and foreign invest-
ment. This form of capital also plays an important role in the development of the
necessary institutional infrastructure. The involvement of the international com-
munity in the economic recovery of the region since 1999 has contributed to a
rise in the inflow of official capital, provided primarily by international financial
organisations with a view to speeding up economic reforms and creating more
favourable conditions for the attraction of private foreign capital.
2. FDI IN SEE COUNTRIES
Tables 4 and 5 show that FDI is primarily oriented to those countries in tran-
sition which have carried out their reforms successfully and at a fast pace. CEE
countries, as the most advanced countries in transition, have been the main
recipients of FDI. At the same time, the flows of FDI into the slow–reforming
SEE countries were more hesitant and slower, and these countries attracted a
much smaller amount of this form of private foreign capital. The flow of FDI
into SEE was especially low until 1997. At the end of 1996, FDI stock in the whole
region amounted to only US$ 3 billion, thus being almost fourteen times smaller
than that in the CEE region at the same time. Slow progress in reforms, coupled
with a high degree of political instability during that period, made this region
absolutely unattractive to foreign investors (OECD 2000).
TABLE 4: Inward FDI stocks in SEE countries (in million US$)
Source: Hunya and Stankovsky 2003.
1/ Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania.
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  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Albania  78  131  201  291  339  384  425  568  775  910 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  .  .  .  .  .  67  243  389  515  798 
Bulgaria  141  247  337  446  951  1488  2307  3309  4122  4600 
Croatia  120  238  359  874  1443  1903  2578  3560  4706  6399 
Moldova  14  29  93  117  193  255  315  446  600  717 
Macedonia  0  24  34  45  61  178  210  386  829  907 
Romania  211  552  971  1234  2449  4480  5469  6480  7613  8700 
Serbia and Montenegro  .  .  .  .  740  853  965  1015  1180  1655 
SEE  564  1220  1994  3007  6175  9607  12513  16153  20340  24686 
CEE
1  12744  18768  32916  41729  47909  66.349  75446  90727  108468  140816 In the period up to 1997, there were considerable differences in FDI inflows
among individual SEE countries. More than 40 percent of total inward FDI stock
was invested in Romania, another 29 percent in Croatia and 15 percent in
Bulgaria. FDI in other countries in this region was much more modest. Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro were the only countries without
FDI inflow during that period due to armed conflicts in the territory of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and the political situation in Serbia and Montenegro, in addi-
tion to the UN–imposed sanctions.
TABLE 5: FDI inflows in SEE countries, 1993– 2003 (in million US$)
Source: Transition Report 2002, 2003.
Since 1997, FDI inflows have been accelerated, mainly as the result of a
change of the privatisation methods in the majority of the SEE countries, from
insider privatisation to direct sales and international tenders. This brought about
a rise in FDI inflow, whose structure was dominated by privatisation–related
FDI. Since 1997, the accelerated process of privatisation in Bulgaria, Croatia and
Romania has significantly increased FDI flows into the region. A special influ-
ence on the increase in FDI inflow during the observed period was exerted by the
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Albania  20  45  65  89  97  42  45  51  141  220  135  150 
Bosnia and  
   
Herzegovina      0  0  0  0  100  90  150  130  230  320 
Bulgaria  41  40  105  98  138  507  537  789  1003  641  430  900 
Croatia  13  102  110  109  486  347  835  1445  1086  1197  383  673 
FYR 
Macedonia 
0  0  24  12  12  18  175  27  175  445  101  100 
Moldova  17  14  18  73  23  78  76  154  128  160  108  97 
Romania  73  87  341  417  415  1267  2079  1025  1051  1154  1080  1350 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
0  0  0  0  0  740  113  112  25  120  562  1000 
SEE  147  274  645  725  1148  2921  3884  3539  3631  3907  2921  4590 
CEE  2951  3689  3278  8447  6682  6480  10735  15146  15923  15363  20337  13041 sale of national telecommunications companies to strategic investors in several
SEE countries. Although the conflict in Kosovo discouraged investment in SEE,
several key privatisations were carried out even in 1999. In 2000 FDI inflows
remained stable to increase to the level of US$ 3,907 in 2001; in 2002 FDI inflows
returned to the pre 2001 level, followed by the record level of US$ 4,590 in 2003.
FDI inflows in the region remained highly concentrated also after 1996. The
main FDI recipient SEE countries have remained the same, with Romania being
responsible for 35.2 percent of total end 2002 SEE region FDI inward stock, fol-
lowed by Croatia with 25.9 percent and Bulgaria with 18.9 percent. It can be
expected that these countries will also attract the largest amount of FDI in the
coming years. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Moldova recorded the lowest FDI
inflow in the region.
In 2002, the ratio of inward FDI stock to GDP in SEE countries mostly
ranged between approximately 20 percent in Romania and Albania and almost
30 percent in Bulgaria and Croatia, Macedonia being somewhere in between
with 24.6 percent. Serbia and Montenegro with 10.6 percent has far the lowest
ration. In terms of inward FDI stock to GDP ratio the differences between the
SEE and CEE countries seem to be lower than in the case of absolute amounts of
FDI. Still, the ratios in Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovak Republic and
Latvia are higher than in any SEE country.
TABLE 6: Inward FDI stocks as percentage of GDP in SEE countries
Source: Hunya and Stankovsky 2003.
The EU member countries as a group are the major investors in the region as a whole, as
well as in most of its countries.
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  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
SEE                     
Albania  6,6  6,6  8,3  10,9  14,8  12,6  11,6  15,1  18,6  19,5 
Bosnia and Herzegovina                     
Bulgaria  1,3  2,5  2,6  4,5  9,1  11,7  17,8  26,3  30,3  29,6 
Croatia  1,1  1,6  1,9  4,4  7,2  8,8  13,0  19,3  24,1  28,5 
Moldova                     
Macedonia  .  0,7  0,8  1,0  1,6  5,0  5,7  10,8  24,1  24,6 
Romania  0,8  1,8  2,7  3,5  6,9  10,7  15,4  17,6  19,0  19,0 
Serbia and Montenegro  .  .  .  .  4,5  5,5  9,6  11,7  10,2  10,6 
CEE                     
Czech Republic  9,8  11,1  14,1  14,9  17,4  25,2  31,9  42,1  47,4  55,3 
Hungary  14,5  17,1  29,0  33,6  35,7  40,0  40,9  43,2  45,1  47,0 
Poland  2,7  4,1  6,2  8,0  10,1  14,2  16,8  21,7  22,4  24,1 
Slovak Republic  .  5,9  6,8  10,0  9,9  13,1  15,8  24,1  27,3  42,2 
Slovenia  7,5  9,2  9,4  10,6  12,1  14,2  13,4  15,3  16,4  22,7 
Estonia  14,5  21,5  20,6  19,2  24,9  34,8  47,5  51,5  57,2  65,9 
Latvia  3,4  8,5  13,9  18,4  22,6  25,6  27,0  29,1  30,4  32,4 
Lithuania  5,8  7,3  5,7  8,9  10,8  14,9  19,4  20,9  22,4  28,9 3. INVESTMENT CLIMATE IN SEE COUNTRIES
A favourable investment environment is a vital prerequisite for FDI to come
in a country. Experience shows that the largest inflow of FDI was recorded in
those transition countries, which have the most favourable investment environ-
ment thanks to the successful implementation of reforms. In this regard, the CEE
countries have made the greatest progress as compared to other countries in
transition, including the SEE ones.
The investment climate in the SEE cannot be regarded as attractive com-
pared to other regions although this scenario is changing. In large measure, it
reflects the hitherto modest progress in carrying out economic and social
reforms in the region. Despite two serious recessions during the past decade, the
periods of macroeconomic instability and delays in carrying out reforms, which
alternated with the shorter periods of ostensible economic recovery, the region
has achieved some favourable results. The SEE countries mostly completed the
initial phase of transition, whereby they made evident progress in liberalisation
and small–scale privatisation, and achieved a certain degree of macroeconomic
stability.
In comparison with other areas of reforms, SEE made the greatest progress
with respect to price, trade and foreign exchange liberalisation. In this regard, the
SEE countries are almost keeping pace with the CEE countries. In 2001, consid-
erable progress in the process of liberalisation was also made in Serbia and
Montenegro, which was the only country in the region which was lagging so
much in that respect. Although some countries have retained a certain degree of
price control, it can be stated that the whole region achieved the degree of liberal-
isation that does not pose an obstacle to FDI inflow.
Small–scale privatisation was relatively successful in almost all countries in
this region. Although Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina are
slightly lagging behind the other countries, they are on a good path to make fur-
ther progress in this area of reform implementation. The small and medium
sized enterprises (SMEs) sector in the SEE countries is the healthiest part of their
economies. Despite evident progress in small–scale privatisation, SEE is still lag-
ging behind the CEE region, which already completed that phase of reforms with
success.
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Foreign direct investment and the investment climate in south-east EuropeTABLE 7: Transition indicators1in SEE countries,
initial phase of transition, 2003
Source: EBRD 2003; Note: 1/ Ranging from minimum 1 = no or little progress to maxi-
mum 4+ = standards of advanced industrial economies.
The SEE region finally succeeded in achieving a certain degree of macroeco-
nomic stability after two periods of pronounced macroeconomic instability (in
the early 1990s and in the period 1997–99). There are good prospects that it will
be maintained in the coming period as well, if not jeopardised by the political
conflicts in Kosovo. The growth prospects of the region are favourable, while the
inflation rates are recording a downward tendency. In 2003, only two countries
recorded two digit inflation, Romania 14.5% and Serbia and Montenegro 12.0%.
The external sector of the SEE countries is still fragile, since exports are much
higher than imports. In 2003, current account deficit in SEE region was –8.6 per
cent of GDP, ranging between –6.0 percent in Croatia and –15.0 percent in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Despite evident progress in the macroeconomic stabilisation of the region, as
well as in liberalisation and small– scale privatisation, there is still a number of
obstacles in the region, which generate an adverse effect on the quality of the
investment environment and, thus, on FDI inflow. A large number of those
obstacles are the result of a slow implementation of reforms in the second phase
of transition, involving the development of institutional infrastructure and pri-
vatisation, as well as the restructuring of enterprises and the financial sector. The
main obstacles to FDI flows into the SEE region are:
– High investment risks (due to circumstances in some part of the region
and more generally, historical perceptions);
– The lack of adequate and modern physical infrastructure;
– Delays in bank restructuring and rehabilitation;
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Price liberalisation  3,7  4,0  4,3  4,0  4,0  4,0  4,3  3,7  4,0  4.2 
Forex and trade liberalisation   4,3  3,7  4,3  4,3  3,3  4,3  4,0  4,3  4,1  4.3 
Small– scale privatisation  4,0  3,0  3,7  4,3  3,0  4,0  3,7  3,3  3,7  4.3 
initial phase of transition  4,0  3,6  4,1  4,2  3,4  4,1  4,0  3,8  3,9  4.3 – Underdeveloped financial markets;
– Delays in large–scale privatisation and enterprise reform;
– Inadequate development level of institutional infrastructure;
– Administrative barriers to FDI;
– Unfavourable legal environment;
– Inadequate institutional strategy and promotional capacities to attract,
retain and maximise FDI inflows.1
High political risks in the region in the past decade posed one of the greatest
obstacles to FDI inflow although this varied amongst countries. Private foreign
capital is very sensitive to any investment risk, so that the countries with an
unstable political and economic environment are almost unattractive to private
foreign investors. As long as there are relatively high political risks, it will be diffi-
cult to attract this form of investment despite good prospects for highly prof-
itable investments. During the past decade, SEE was a region with very high
investment risks due to armed, ethnic and political conflicts that broke out after
the collapse of the former Yugoslavia (Penev 2001).
The suspension of hostilities and relative relaxation of political tension in the
region were of utmost significance for the lessening of political risks, but not for
their total elimination or changing lingering perceptions. In Kosovo there is still
a high degree of political tension and instability.
Privatisation  and restructuring of large socially– and state–owned loss–
making enterprises were much less successful in comparison with small–scale
privatisation in the SEE countries. Mass voucher privatisations carried out in the
majority of these countries during the first half of the 1990s did not result in the
restructuring and economic recovery of large privatised enterprises. The priva-
tised enterprises remained to have fragmented ownership structure, inadequate
managerial structure and the modest amount of available funds for additional
investments.
After unfavourable experiences with mass voucher privatisations, the SEE
countries shifted to more efficient revenue–raising privatisations, including the
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1 According to interviews among Slovenian investors the most important disadvantages of suc-
cessor countries of the former Yugoslavia as host countries for FDI are high country risks due
to: (i) ongoing political instability and institutional weaknesses; and (ii) the very slow process
of economic recovery and transition towards a market economy, which has led to moderate
purchasing power and insolvency. Host–country legislation, in fact the lack of a legal frame-
work, slow administrative procedures and unfinished privatisation process were also assessed
as disturbing for FDI in these countries. These disadvantages exist in each successor country,
yet their relative importance differs from one country to another. In Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Serbia and Montenegro and Macedonia political and institutional weaknesses dominate,
while in Croatia economic and financial risks are more important (Jakli~ and Svetli~i~ 2002).sale of enterprises to strategic investors through international tenders. It was
attempted not only to secure the inflow of fresh capital, but also to restructure pri-
vatised enterprises more efficiently by making use of other favourable effects of
FDI. The change of the privatisation methods had a favourable effect on the flow of
privatisation–related FDI into the region, primarily due to a more intensified
process of large–scale privatisation and several successful large–scale privatisations
in Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria. Despite the initial results, the process of privati-
sation of large socially– and state–owned enterprises has already encountered seri-
ous obstacles due to the impossibility of finding strategic partners for investing in
their privatisation. This refers especially to the less developed countries in the
region (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro). Although
some enterprises are offered for sale at a very low price, the level of their indebted-
ness, redundancies, obsolete equipment and poor condition of their facilities and
related infrastructure discourage potential foreign investors.
Despite the problems relating to large–scale privatisations, it is expected that
the process will be continued in the coming period, albeit with a varying degree
of success across the countries.
A considerably greater problem relating to the improvement of the invest-
ment environment will be to raise the quality of governance and enterprise
restructuring. Soft budget constraints and poor corporate governance are still
present in most SEE countries, so that the least progress has so far been made in
this sector.
The development of the banking and financial sector (banking sector and
non–banking financial institutions) was one of the most difficult reform areas,
not only in SEE, due to the inherited low development level of this sector in the
pre–reform period and the non–existence or low development level of financial
institutions in the region. The unfavourable situation in the banking and finan-
cial sector in the SEE countries posed a serious obstacle to FDI flow into the
region in the early 1990s.
Despite various problems and obstacles encountered in the implementation
of reforms in this sector, most countries in this region still made some progress.
The progress made in developing the banking sector was considerably faster than
the progress made in developing securities markets and non– banking financial
institutions in the SEE countries. Most banks were privatised with a large partic-
ipation of foreign banks. New foreign and domestic banks were also established,
while some of the unsuccessful domestic banks were closed. This had a
favourable impact on enhancing competition and the quality of services in this
sector in most SEE countries, but the region as a whole is still lagging far behind
the CEE countries in this respect.
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Slavica Penev, Matija RojecCroatia, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Romania have made considerably greater
progress in the restructuring of the banking sector than other countries in the
region. Therefore, the underdeveloped banking sector and the quality of banking
services – not only in Serbia and Montenegro, which began restructuring its
banking sector as late as 2001, but also in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova and
Albania, still pose a serious obstacle to the creation of a favourable investment
environment and, thus, to FDI inflow.
Due to the much slower development of securities markets and non–banking
financial institutions, the development level of the financial market and other
non–banking institutions is very low in the majority of these countries.
However, it poses a much greater obstacle to the inflow of portfolio investment,
since FDI inflow depends to a much lesser degree on the quality of financial mar-
kets. Even in Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, which made the greatest progress
in this area, the development level of these financial institutions is still inade-
quate and far below the market–economy standards.
TABLE 8: Transition indicators1for SEE countries, second phase, 2003
Source: EBRD 2003; Note: 1/ Ranging from minimum 1 = no or little progress to maximum
4+ = standards of advanced industrial economies.
The condition of physical infrastructure is one of the major preconditions
for the creation of a favourable investment environment and FDI inflow. By ini-
tiating the process of transition to a market economy, the former socialist coun-
tries had, as one of their priorities, to improve the quality and price competitive-
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Large– scale privatisation  2,3  2,4  3,6  3,0  1,0  3,0  3,4  3,0  2,7  3.7 
Enterprise reform  2,0  1,6  2,4  2,6  1,0  2,6  2,0  2,0  2,0  3.2 
Competition policy  1,7  1,0  2,4  2,4  1,0  2,0  2,4  2,0  1,9  2.9 
Infrastructure reform  2,0  2,2  3,0  2,9  2,0  2,1  3,2  2,4  2,5  3.1 
Banking sector reform  2,3  2,4  3,0  3,4  1,0  3,0  2,6  2,4  2,5  3.5 
Reform of non–banking financial 
institutions 
1,7  1,0  2,0  2,4  1,0  1,6  2,0  2,0  1,7 
3.2 
Second phase reforms  2,0  1,9  2,8  2,9  2,0  2,3  2,6  2,3  2,3  3.3 ness of their infrastructural services, which had not been adjusted to market–
based economic conditions in the pre–reform period. A vital prerequisite for the
replacement of the inherited obsolete technology and equipment in this sector
was to intensify investment activity. The decline of domestic capital formation
and the low level of domestic saving, coupled with the persistent budget deficit in
these countries, prevented any significant investment finance from the budget, as
was practised in this countries in the pre–reform period. Since the government
budget cannot secure sufficient investment finance, the participation of foreign
and domestic private capital in infrastructure investment will be of great signifi-
cance, not only because it will provide fresh capital for such investment, but also
because it will enable the commercialisation of infrastructural services and, thus,
the improvement of their quality.
TABLE 9: Average infrastructure transition indicators for SEE countries1,
1998–2003
Source: EBRD 2001, EBRD database; Note: 1/ Ranging from minimum 1 = no or little
progress to maximum 4+ = standards of advanced industrial economies.
In most SEE countries, foreign private capital has so far been invested in the
telecommunications sector. However, private investment in this sector does not
guarantee a rise in the level and quality of services, because the possibility that
foreign investors assume a monopolistic position on the domestic market poses
an additional threat to the levels of prices and quality of these services in the SEE
countries. This is shown by the unfavourable experience of Serbia and
Montenegro where, despite the privatisation of Telecom, investment activity was
not intensified as expected, while the level of prices rose appreciably.
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  1998  2003 
Albania  1,3  2,0 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  n.a.  2,3 
Bulgaria  2,3  2,7 
Croatia  2,0  2,7 
Romania  2,7  3,0 
Macedonia  1,7  2,0 
Moldova  2,0  2,0 
Serbia and Montenegro  1,7  2,0 
SEE  2,4  2,3 
CEE  2,9  3.1 TABLE 10: Infrastructure transition indicators for SEE countries1, 2003
Source: EBRD 2001, EBRD database; Note: 1/ Ranging from minimum 1 = no or little
progress to maximum 4+ = standards of advanced industrial economies.
It is expected that private investments in the power supply sector will be
intensified in the coming period. This would have a favourable influence on solv-
ing the problem of electric power shortage, in particular, in some SEE countries,
which otherwise poses a serious obstacle to FDI flows into them.
Investments in the construction of the road and railway networks in the SEE
countries are still insufficient, so that the greater improvement of the quality of relat-
ed services can be expected only after the completion of a number of regional pro-
jects which are financed by international financial institutions (EIB, EBRD, WB).
Despite the interest of foreign investors in investing in physical infrastruc-
ture and active participation of international financial institutions in financing
the development of infrastructure in the region, the quality of related services
will be a problem for the majority of SEE countries for a long time, and will pose
one of the most serious obstacles to FDI inflow. The difficulties in removing this
obstacle to FDI inflow arise largely from the need to provide an extremely large
amount of investment so as to achieve the desired quality of services, acceptable
to foreign investors.
Administrative barriers to FDI are present in all countries in this region. The
complicated administrative procedures required for the start–up and operation of
a business discourage the inflows of FDI. The related costs are less significant for
foreign investors. The most serious barriers appear to be delays in gaining access
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  Telecom– 
munications 
Electric 
power 
 
Railway
s 
 
Roads 
Water 
and waste 
water 
Average 
infrastructure 
transition 
indicators 
Albania  3+  2+  2  2  1+  2 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  3+  2  2  n.a.  1  2+ 
Bulgaria  3  3+  3  2+  3  3- 
Croatia  3+  2+  2+  2+  3+  3- 
Romania  3  3  4  3  3  3 
Macedonia  2  2+  2  n.a.  1+  2 
Moldova  2+  3+  2  2  2  2 
Serbia and Montenegro  2  2  2  2  2  2 
SEE  2,9  2,7  2,4  2,3  2,2  2+ 
CEE  3,4  2,8  3,2  3,0  4,0  3.1 to sites and obtaining building permits, which may take more than a year in some
SEE countries. The level of administrative costs is positively correlated with cor-
ruption incidence and displays a negative correlation with the quality of gover-
nance, degree of openness and wages in the public sector. These correlations sug-
gest that administrative reforms should be incorporated into the broader agenda
for reforms, such as trade and financial liberalisation, the fight against corruption
and public sector administration (see Morisset and Lumenga Neso 2002).
Unfavourable legal and regulatory environment is not only a result of the
non– existence of legislation which is harmonised with the market– economy stan-
dards, but also of an inadequate implementation of existing laws (EBRD 2002a).
Although much greater progress was made in enacting the new, modern and liber-
al laws and the revision of certain existing ones with the aim to harmonise them
with the market–economy standards, the implementation of these laws as well as
the lack of adequate institutional infrastructure still pose the most serious obstacle
to the creation of a favourable legal environment in the SEE countries.
Private foreign capital is very sensitive to any legal uncertainty, which points
out that the creation of a favourable legal and regulatory environment for FDI
flows into the region is of utmost significance.
4. EU AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION AS DETERMINANTS OF FDI INFLOWS
In the above transition context, we argue that there are two specific reform
and policy directions which could help in making the SEE region a more attrac-
tive FDI location. The first is EU integration process of SEE countries and the
second is regional integration and co-operation among them.
There is theoretical and empirical evidence, which demonstrates that EU inte-
gration processes, in the accession and membership phase, significantly and posi-
tively influence the FDI inflows in the accessing countries. One can distinguish
between primary and secondary effects of economic integration on FDI flows.
Primary effects relate to: (i) defensive export-substituting investment, which
replaces exports with FDI in a country of integration (increased market-seeking
FDI inflows in the integration region) and (ii) reorganisation investment due to
new configuration of location advantages among integration member countries
(FDI gains in some countries are offset by FDI losses in others). Secondary effect
of integration is of the greatest importance. It arises from the restructuring of
activities between countries, sectors and firms, and from the new opportunities
due to integration. Lower transaction costs increase capital mobility within inter-
nal market. This increases FDI in regionally based affiliates and sourcing by MNEs
in the region (Dunning 1993). In short, why should one expect increase of FDI in
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Slavica Penev, Matija Rojeccountries integrating in the EU. There are two basic reasons. The first is reduction
of risk, which brings new investment opportunities. The second is the effect of the
increased size of the market (economies of scale) and the third is the “internal
market” component, which importantly reduces transaction costs (application of
acquis communautaire, unification of institutional infrastructure) and brings
new configuration of location advantages.
On the empirical level, the experiences of Denmark, Ireland, UK, Portugal,
Spain, Austria, Finland and Sweden show an increased amount of inward FDI in
the context of their EU integration processes. FDI inflows, in absolute terms and
as a share of total EU inflows, began to increase already few years before their
actual accession. In all the above countries absolute amount of FDI inflows fur-
ther increased after accession. But in relative terms - as a share of EU inflows -
the effect of accession seems to be absorbed already before accession. In most
countries the shares have not increased much after accession (Rosati 1998, UNC-
TAD 2003). The situation in the case of Eastern Enlargement is pretty much the
same as far as the pre-accession FDI trends is concerned. As shown by Figure 1,
FDI inflows in the accession countries have been constantly increasing in the
recent years. Economist Intelligence Unit (2003) predicts that the share of 8
Central European accession countries plus of Romania and Bulgaria in world
inward FDI stock will increase from 2.2% in 2000 to 3.2% in 2007. Bevan and
Estrin (2000) and Merlevede and Schoors (2004) also claim that announcements
of progress in EU accession by the Commission impacted directly upon FDI
receipts of the Eastern Enlargement accession countries.
FIGURE 1: FDI inflows to Eastern Enlargement accession countries
Source: UNCTAD 2003.
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Although one can not precisely isolate and directly assess the relevance of the
EU integration process as such on FDI inflows, it seems pretty sure that its effect
is positive and significant. In this context, a strong and clear commitment of SEE
countries that structural/institutional and legal reforms will follow the EU pat-
tern, i.e. the establishment of an EU-compatible institutional framework, would
be of great importance. It would reduce (i) the risk perception of these countries
by foreign investors and (ii) also the danger of further widening the institutional
gap between them and the new EU member countries. Bevan and Estrin (2000),
and Merlevede and Schoors (2004) warn that a further differentiation between
new member states and left-outs may happen in favour of the former.
On the other hand, the Eastern Enlargement is also going to gradually estab-
lish a “new frontier” for efficiency-seeking FDI. A number of efficiency-seeking
type of activities of foreign subsidiaries now located in the new EU member
countries will gradually move out of the EU, SEE countries being an obvious
location. The issue for SEE governments is how to adjust policies and measures
to exploit the opportunities offered by this new situation (UNCTAD 2003). The
issue of friendly business environment and EU compatible legal and institutional
framework again come in the forefront here.
Intensification of regional integration and co–operation among SEE coun-
tries is another process, which would increase the attractiveness of SEE region as
an investment location. In view of the fact that, except Romania, all SEE country
markets are small and that the region’s total GDP is very low, each of them, if
alone, has a market which is not sufficiently attractive for market–seeking FDI.
An SEE free trade area would mean the market of over 57 million inhabitants,
which will be much more attractive than the individual markets of the SEE coun-
tries. Regional integration would also have positive effects on the lessening of
high political risks in the region and, thus, on the improvement of its investment
climate. Regional integration is also one of the preconditions for the SEE coun-
tries to speed up the process of EU integration.
5. CONCLUSIONS
FDI has become increasingly important for countries in transition, but it is
primarily oriented to those countries in transition which have carried out their
reforms successfully and at a fast pace. At the same time, the flows of FDI into the
slow–reforming SEE countries were more hesitant and slower. The flow of FDI
into SEE was especially low until 1997. Slow progress in reforms, coupled with a
high degree of political instability during that period, made this region absolute-
ly unattractive to foreign investors. Since 1997, FDI inflows have been accelerat-Foreign direct investment and the investment climate in south-east Europe
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ed, mainly as the result of a change of the privatisation methods in the majority
of the SEE countries, from insider privatisation to direct sales and international
tenders. This brought about a rise in FDI inflow, whose structure was dominated
by privatisation–related FDI. The EU member countries as a group are the major
investors in the region as a whole, as well as in most of its countries.
The investment climate in the SEE has improved in recent years, but much
more needs to be done in order to attract larger and sustained volumes of FDI. In
large measure, the present investment climate reflects the hitherto relatively
modest progress in carrying out economic and social reforms in the region.
Despite two serious recessions during the past decade, that the region has
achieved some favourable results. The SEE countries mostly completed the initial
phase of transition, whereby they made evident progress in liberalisation and
small–scale privatisation, and achieved a certain degree of macroeconomic sta-
bility. Despite evident progress in the macroeconomic stabilisation of the region,
as well as in liberalisation and small– scale privatisation, there is still a number of
obstacles in the region, which generate an adverse effect on the quality of the
investment environment and, thus, on FDI inflow. A large number of those
obstacles are the result of a slow implementation of reforms in the second phase
of transition, involving the development of institutional infrastructure and pri-
vatisation, as well as the restructuring of enterprises and the financial sector. The
main obstacles to FDI flows into the SEE region are: high investment risks, the
lack of adequate physical infrastructure, delays in bank restructuring and reha-
bilitation, underdeveloped financial markets, delays in large–scale privatisation
and enterprise reform, inadequate development level of institutional infrastruc-
ture, administrative barriers to FDI and unfavourable legal environment.
The potential advantages of SEE for attracting FDI are not so numerable, but
their identification is of utmost significance for the creation of FDI strategy in
this region. The most important potential advantage is the availability of quali-
fied and relatively cheap labour. Other comparative advantages of the region are
less significant, but they still may have a positive effect on the attraction of the
FDI. The size of the market and growing purchasing power of the population
and the geographical location of the region are only conditional advantages. In
the next few years it is more realistic to expect FDI into privatisation related pro-
jects than in export oriented greenfield projects, since greenfield projects request
much better defined FDI policy and less barriers. FDI policy as such, however,
could have only a limited impact.
The major determinant of future FDI inflows in SEE countries are factors
like market size and growth, speed and scope of market reforms, political, eco-
nomic and legal stability, reduction of administrative barriers and implementa-tion gap, speed and scope of EU integration etc., which are not specifically relat-
ed to FDI and whose importance is far beyond the FDI issues. These factors are
related to the major transition and EU integration issues. In this context, a strong
and clear commitment of SEE countries that structural/institutional and legal
reforms will follow the EU pattern, i.e. the establishment of an EU-compatible
institutional framework, would be of major importance. It would reduce (i) the
risk perception of these countries by foreign investors and (ii) also the danger of
further widening the institutional gap to the new EU member countries. Namely,
some warn that a further differentiation between new member states and left-
outs may happen in favour of the former. On the other hand, the Eastern
Enlargement is also going to gradually establish a “new frontier” for efficiency-
seeking FDI. A number of efficiency-seeking type of activities of foreign sub-
sidiaries now going on in the new EU member countries will gradually move out
of the EU, SEE countries being an obvious location. To exploit this opportunity
the issues of friendly business environment, EU compatible legal and institution-
al framework and SEE regional integration again come in the forefront.
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